

# Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity

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**Abstract:** Here I have focused on R M Adams's view on individual identity and possible worlds coupled with a short entry on Dun Scotus's notion of haecceity. This should enable one to see where the theories of Leibnitz, Kripke, Adams meet and diverge – taking one to a more comprehensive picture on the issue of individual essences. Adams explicitly avoids the term 'individual essence' – reserving it only for general essences. But his exposition can be read as suggesting an impressive way of reconciling the seemingly opposed approaches of Leibnitz and Kripke – the former admitting individuality to be strictly qualitative while the latter insisting it to be non-qualitative. Adams prefers to dub this individual identity as '*Primitive thisness*' and clarifies that thisness being the property of being identical to a unique individual can thereby be defined independent of any reference to a property – which is by definition general and shareable. On the other hand suchness is a purely qualitative notion and does not fall back to any reference to a unique individual. Adams also points out that *de re* identity or transworld identity is *primitive* in the sense that it cannot fall back on a more fundamental property or relation. And the mark of an identity being primitive or non-derivative is its power to explain why two apparently two individuals are really one or the reverse.

**Keywords:** *de dicto*, *de re*, Primitive Thisness, Transworld Identity, Haecceity

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## 1. Introduction

Adams exposes a certain problem in Leibnitz's notion of an individual identity [13] in so far as it is claimed to be purely qualitative. As for Leibnitz each quality is non-repeatable, i.e., it exhausts in a unique individual, the same individual apparently recurring in possible worlds will actually amount to alternative sets of qualities or suchnesses – with no non-qualitative thisness spilling over these sets or clusters. Adams points out that in Leibnitz's scheme it is not clear as to what constitutes the transworld qualitative identity of an individual, for there seems to be no underlying general principle that would govern which qualities or suchnesses are to be pooled together to form the individual in  $W_1$  and which are to form the identity in  $W_2$ , nor will it settle the borderline cases between a set of qualities in one world (say tallness, baldness and intelligence in  $W_1$  and their opposites in  $W_2$ ) To leave this matter entirely to conventional definitions will go against our intuitions. [1] Hence Adams declares that while the identity relation in the same world is primitive and goes beyond the qualitative or non-qualitative character of thisness,

when it comes to transworld identity – this is must better explained in terms of non-qualitative thisness. Without the latter no basis of identifying the same individual across the different and even contradictory sets of suchnesses can be secured.

Adams contrives a special argument to demonstrate the transworld identity to be non-qualitative. He asks us to conceive three different worlds –  $W_1$   $W_2$  and  $W_3$  - and places two objects viz. a and b in  $W_1$ , preserves a and annihilates b in  $W_2$ , and finally preserves b and annihilates a in  $W_3$ . (I have used diagrams to give an explicit representation of Adams's argument in this connection.) Leibnitz cannot argue that the two b-s in  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  are qualitatively different – the non-existence of b in  $W_2$  rules out that possibility. Hence a non-qualitative thisness of b irresistibly juts out as the transworld identity across  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ , similar remarks apply to a as well.

According to Adams Leibnitz laboured under the presupposition that the only way to secure two (or more) indiscernible (i.e. qualitatively identical but numerically distinct) individuals is to conceive different instances of the same qualities recurring in different positions of the same space-time framework – which would virtually inject

qualitative differences in the putatively indiscernible objects. Leibnitz did not explore the other possibility of placing the individual outside its actual spatio-temporal relations and thereby failed to hit upon world-differences that would preserve the same individual - purified of all differences of qualities pertaining to its different spatio-temporal positions.

For Kripke too the transworld identity [2] of an object consists in its being free from the spatial interactions and the historical vicissitudes it enters into in the actual world. World-differences cannot be the difference between objects that are qualitatively the same but have different origins, i.e. have different spatio-temporal positions within the same framework. Adams points out that any proposal that an individual may be born at a different moment or go through a different stretch of time - will load that individual with a different history and a different repertoire of memory - which will make him virtually different from the original. Further one cannot posit that the individual in actual world i.e.  $W_1$  carries his history or memory content in  $W_2$  as well, for that would imply that the object in the possible world being causally linked to the original in the actual world. Adams affirms that possible worlds are in *logical* space, not causal space - i.e. there cannot be causal relations among possible worlds.

A part of Kripke and Plantinga's engagement is with individual essences rather than with class-essences - and this cuts out a smooth transition to R Adams's theory of *Primitive thisness*. Adams [1] presents this account in relation to Leibnitz's theory of Identity of Indiscernibles (henceforth I. I.) on the one hand and the theories of non-descriptive reference or non-descriptive transworld identity (Kripke and Putnam) on the other. There are at least two crucial points that we need to reckon for a proper appreciation and placement of Adams's view in the entire problematic concerning the qualitative versus non-qualitative character of individual essences.

First, he holds that *the exact area of incompatibility between Leibnitz's theory and the theories of non-descriptive reference* (held by Kripke and Putnam) *pertains* not simply to the doctrine of a purely qualitative universe endorsed by Leibnitz, but *to a certain reading of Leibnitz's theory of Identity of Indiscernibles*. [12]

Second, Adams will be accepting the theory of *Primitive thisness* but articulate its difference from the theory of non-descriptive reference of trans world identity - which implies that for him *Primitive thisness is different from primitive transworld identity*.

*Adams's Account of Individual, Thisness and Suchness:* Adams puts particulars like the persons, physical objects and events under the notion of individual - adding that according to the general assumption, numbers and universals typically fall outside this category. He also notes that particular spaces and times will be accorded the status of particulars if space and time are assumed to enjoy an ontology independent of their relation to objects and events. He explains that persons, physical objects and events are individuals - as contrasted with numbers and universals - clearly suggesting that while

numbers and universals are shareable by different individuals or different clusters of individuals, *individuals themselves are not shareable amongst individuals*. In this sense, places and times - if they are able to preserve an absolute and unshareable identity - independent of their being relations between persons, events and objects - will also have to be conferred the status of individuals.

Adams goes on to define *thisness* as the property of being identical with a particular individual, and clarifies that this should not be understood as a property of being identical with some individual or other - in which case it will lapse into a commonly shareable property, or a universal. *Thisness should be understood as the unique non-shareable property of being identical with a unique individual*. Adams also reports what he thinks to be an unfortunate usage of the word 'essence' (usually reserved for common and qualitative properties) in so far as it is made to stand for thisness - an usage adopted by Plantinga. [3] As Adams on the other hand is specially concerned with unique identity of individuals along with the question whether this identity is non-qualitative or not - he prefers to use the term 'thisness' and not 'essence' for this purpose. Being aware that the term 'essence' usually connotes a commonly shareable property and not a unique feature, Adams adds that he wants the word 'thisness' to carry as minimal load as possible.

Adams further clarified that to demand thisness to be non-qualitative is not to claim that there are bare particulars - from which all qualities have been removed. Nor does the theory of qualitative thisness reduce individuals to a bundle of qualities. *Dun Scotus treated individuals as compounded of properties, of which haecceity was claimed to be a special component which persists even when other components are removed. As Adams does not take properties to be components he cannot also take Primitive thisness as equivalent to Scotus's haecceity*. [3]

While the notion of thisness can be clarified in terms other than that of property, the notion of suchness cannot be. Adams goes on to clarify that suchness is a purely qualitative property- so that it can be expressed without the help of any referential expressions like proper names, proper adjectives (e.g. 'Kantian'), proper verbs (like 'Socratizes'), indexicals, personal pronouns, or definite description. More precisely it can be defined as comprising of all properties that are in principle general or shareable, and bereft of any relation to any particular individual, or an extensionally defined set. Thus the property of *being to the left of* may be a basic suchness, but the property of being to the left of *a* (where *a* is an individual) will not be a basic suchness.

Adams argues that *one cannot rule out the possibility that a thisness or a property of being a particular individual is constructed out of basic suchnesses*. This was exactly the way Leibnitz sought to explain individuality in purely qualitative terms - a project that Kripke rejects. Adams states that there are two permissible ways of expanding on basic suchnesses - one is by logical operation of 'not', 'or' or existential quantifiers, and the other is by adding epistemic qualifiers like 'believes that' or 'wishes that' on a proposition

p where p itself is constructed from basic suchnesses by permissible operations.

Pending the question whether a construction of individuality or thisness from suchness is possible or not – one can say that suchness is a notion that is to be defined recursively – either as being a basic suchness or as being construable from basic suchnesses in the ways indicated.

Though Adams does not commit himself to any non-qualitative thisness, he does indeed admit the framework of a distinction between the qualitative and the non-qualitative. That is to say, his project is definitely against the theories that would seek to reduce all quantity to quality – i.e. against the claim that all properties are suchnesses or that all facts are purely qualitative. Different versions of idealism specially that of Leibnitz will fall under the genre of such theories.

## 2. Adams's Critical Exposition of Leibnitz's Theory of Singularity, Completeness and Reference

Leibnitz holds that thisness of each individual is actually a suchness – so that singularity consists in a property belonging to an unique individual, or 'singulars' virtually turn out to be the lowest or final species – where such individuals constitutes a single species, i.e., each species is constituted by a single individual. Taking any property, we can go on adding progressively narrower qualifiers to it – like adding the specificity of crimsonness to redness, then adding more and more fine-tuned shades under crimsonness – on and on – until we reach a point when no more specifiers can be added. *As long as a property admits of further specifiers – it (the property) will be generalizable, or shareable among more than one instance; but when a property becomes fully saturated, so as to admit of no further specifier it will be logically non-repeatable, or non shareable – it will coalesce into a unique individual. Singularity is a simple and purely qualitative concept.* From this Leibnitz lands onto the notion of completeness – according to which the concept of an individual implies every predicate of the individual. The force of his contention seems to be this – if an individual is constituted by the maximally individualized properties, then no such property can – by definition – belong to more than one individual, and hence all such properties get individualized in a unique individual. In other words an individual must possess all his thisnesses in the actual world, it cannot have alternate predicates (like being unmarried, or being bearded) in possible worlds. [13]

Adams however says that Leibnitz need not have drawn this counter-intuitive conclusion – he could have conceived completeness in terms of a *disjunction* of maximally individualized properties – different sub-sets of which occur in different worlds, thus preserving the common-sensical idea of the same individual having different properties in different possible worlds. The theory that properties get maximally tapered down to a unique individual does not entail the

theory of completeness.

Adams observes that the theory of direct or non-descriptive reference seems to be a modernized version of the theory of non-qualitative thisness. He concedes the fact that one can refer to an individual – without knowing any qualitative property or any disjunction of such properties – by means of proper names, indexicals or a referring use of definite description. *But for Adams this only shows that this non-qualitative thisness is semantically primitive, not that it is ontologically primitive.* It does not demonstrate that thisnesses are, metaphysically speaking, fundamental nor that thisnesses are not actually analyzable into qualitative suchnesses. And Adams holds that Leibnitz will also concede the semantic ability of direct or non-descriptive reference, without the ability of going down to the minuscule level of the fully individualized quality or suchness. Knowledge of such infinite complexity would require nothing less than the omniscience of God. Hence, *Adams says, we as finite being, being ignorant of the concept of the individual – the fully saturated fine tuned concept – must gloss it over in terms of a quantitative notion; and thus refer to the individual simply in terms of the notion of the individual or haecceity* – say of Gandhi or Aristotle. Adams seems to be suggesting that the semantic task of referring is based on a minimalized, coarse grained notion – that of being identical with Aristotle for instance. This is the only option left for us finite beings, to whom the super-fine reference to individuals in virtue of the *Primitive thisness* is unavailable.

*This theory would be interestingly different from that of Kripke, Putnam (and perhaps also Plantinga).* [8] For both of Kripke and Putnam the referent hits us directly, or through a causal chain – independent of any observable quality of the referent. And going by the suggestions of Kripke – viz. that the atomic theory of the microscopic structures of matter may be wrong [12], one can suggest that the observable properties of atomic structure, the images of H<sub>2</sub>O particles may deviate from reality, or project an atom composition, which are *not* how the facts are. But for Kripke and Putnam if the atomic theory is true, or if H<sub>2</sub>O happens to be the atomic structure of water in *one* world, it has to be the *same* structure in *all* possible worlds. This claim cannot be made for the cold or liquid character of water, not even about its property of dissolving lime. For Kripke it is the reality or referent itself and not a *description* of an observable property (the latter being dispensable or contingent), still less a depleted description like 'the referent of Alexander' or 'the property of being identical with Alexander', that gets into our referring activities. *On the other hand, for Leibnitz, as reported by Adams, reference may be achieved by any of the above descriptions, but the ontological reality of referent consists in a maximally individualized suchness.* In spite of this difference between Leibnitz's view on the one hand and a non-descriptive view of reference on the other hand a fine streak of similarity seems to run between the two. For Kripke too, reference often comes in the garb of a dispensable and contingent property, like 'the length of the one meter stick kept in Paris' taking us to the rigid identity of one meter in

all possible worlds; and like Leibniz Kripke would indeed say that the fine-grained properties like the precise origin of an individual, or its unique atomic composition may be available only to some specialists, and not the layperson. However, Kripke will obviously not move into a Leibnizian theory of complete concept of an individual enjoyed only by the omniscient. Besides a pronounced difference between Leibniz and Kripke would persist – *while for Kripke the fine tuned reality actually gets into the referring activities – independent of whether that reality is known by the referrer – for Leibniz the referring activities of imperfect finite referrers misses out on that maximally individualized properties – the actual referent. It further seems that for Kripke, unlike Leibniz, properties can never attain the status of being uniquely individualized, and more importantly, properties by definition are observational properties, and as observational properties (like length of stick  $s$  at time  $t_0$ , images of  $H_2O$ , feeling of molecular rapidity or slowness) always depend upon certain contingent conditions, they can never constitute essence. However, while for Kripke properties can never be uniquely individualized in terms of the individual it belongs to, the phenomenological identity of the property, i.e. the felt character of the property has a transworld essence.* (Kripke, 1980, Lecture III) [12]

Adams's Treatment of the Principle of I.I. Adams's main concern is not with the semantic theory of direct reference, but with the ontological issue of thisness and its relation with Leibniz's principle of I.I. The principle in its strongest formulation comes to this –

Any two distinct individuals must differ in some suchness – either relational or non-relational. If they do not differ with regard any of these suchnesses, they must be identical.

That two distinct individuals must exhibit a difference in their suchness is a modal claim or a necessity claim. A refutation of this principle would consist in showing a counter example of two things possessing the same suchnesses, but having different thisnesses. And this would obviously give us a defence of the claim of non-qualitative thisness.

As for Leibniz there can be no two individuals that are alike in all their qualities, similarly there can be no two worlds that are qualitatively similar. *Hence for each individual the suchness that he possesses will be world-specific, i.e. whatever world-variation we may attempt to contrive with respect to any individual, we cannot retain the same suchness across a variation of worlds, while making their thisnesses different.* Each suchness constitutes an individual identity or thisness.

Adams leaves open the possibility for there to be distinct but qualitatively indiscernible individuals –and so that there may be individuals whose thisnesses are both distinct from all such-nesses. Even if some thisnesses are necessarily equivalent to some suchnesses, there are some cases where thisnesses will be distinct from all suchnesses.

Adams goes on to consider a well-rehearsed argument against the principle of I.I. often dubbed as 'spatial dispersion argument' formulated by Max Black. Suppose

there are two identical iron globes in two universes – same in their chemical composition, colour and all other qualities. Also each of them is equidistant from another globe. In this track we can think of numerically distinct universes which are indistinguishable with respect to all their qualities, they have the same history of growing with respect to a central point, line or plane, in a symmetrical structure. They can even be imagined to repeat themselves infinitely to every direction in the same way – like a three dimensional wall paper pattern with breathtaking layers of details and complexities. The reason why these two qualitatively identical things are actually two, is simply because they are spatially dispersed or distanced from each other. The same thing cannot be in two places, i.e. cannot be spatially distanced from itself. [12]

There can be a similar argument –viz. argument from temporal dispersion – that can be effectively applied against the principle of I.I. One can imagine a universe with states occupying the same space and same qualities – but only temporally distinct from one another. Similarly there can be indistinguishable persons and physical objects in the same place but at different times.

Adams goes on to discuss Ian Hacking's treatment of the spatial dispersion argument against Leibniz's principle of I.I. Though not concurring with Leibniz on the principle of I.I. Hacking at least holds that one cannot refute this principle by this argument. Hacking's proposal is that there can be indiscernible identicals that are available to different ways of describing – irrespective of how things really are. One way of using description is to make two non-identical things indiscernible, on the other hand we can put description in a way so as to make two indiscernible individuals actually one. Hacking does not accept anything like a compelling fact of non-identity erupting with an explosive force, over and above the indiscernibility of descriptive properties, he would say that the purported indiscernibility between *two objects* can be *described as* numerical oneness. Thus difference or non-identity does not spill over descriptions – it is our description that shape up the referent – the referent is not non-descriptional or non-qualitative *by itself*. Hacking gives a specific counter-example against the argument of spatial and temporal dispersion that is customarily leveled against Leibniz's principle of I.I. What seems to be a fact of reaching another qualitatively identical (but numerically distinct) globe by walking two diameters away, can actually be described as returning back to the same globe by travelling through an extremely curvaceous space. What seems to be the empty flat intermediary space between the two indiscernible objects in an Euclidean framework can be re-described in a different way in a non-Euclidean curved geometry – i.e. as a curved extension of the purported first globe into the second. Going by the same line of contention one can perhaps adopt a reverse direction – one can perhaps say that the same iron globe having two standard facets ('morning star' and 'evening star') [5, 6] or the same Delhi University North Campus with two sides ('the Chatra Marg' and 'the Patel Chest') can be described in a way to make both

these singular things with purportedly two aspects actually two, not one. In an extremely flattened out space – the so called unitary object will splinter into different layers – or different referents. In fine, *Hacking suggests that the spatial dispersion argument leveled against the principle of I.I. – claiming to demonstrate the non-identity of two indiscernible individuals – will work only in an Euclidean space – not in an extremely non-Euclidean curvature where the non-identity merges into an identity.*

*Adams Against Hacking's Objection to the Spatial Dispersion Argument:* Adams argues that the first way to reject Hacking's approach is to argue against the very claim that it is only in absolute space and time in the Euclidean model and not in the non-Euclidean model that the non-identity of indiscernibles can be proved. One can insist that these two different geometries would constitute two different ontologies – the same paths in the same world cannot be alternatively described as Euclidean straight paths versus non-Euclidean straight paths. Geometry is not simply a way of describing more primitive facts about objects in space, it is determined by a prior number of objects, geometry cannot create numbers, or be constitutive of numerical identities. Thus the difference between two indiscernible globes with two different geometries is a real difference – difference between two primitive realities and not a difference of descriptions. The flat intermediary space between two indiscernible globes together constitute a space-time relation that is real – it is *relational* but not *relative*. We can add that Leibnitz himself will not agree with Hacking's strategy to defend his own principle of I.I. by confining it to a Euclidean space. For Leibnitz also there is a unique way in which monads space out reality in terms of their representations – so space turns out to be relational, not relative. [7] So is an extremely curved space where the two fuse into one – this constitutes a real fusion of a real curvature. The flat Euclidean space and the non-Euclidean one are two distinct realities, and so are the pair of indiscernible globes *vis a vis* the single fusion.

In other words unlike Hacking Adams is not inclined to put too much weight on the conception of geometry in order to refute the spatial dispersion argument that is customarily leveled against I.I. On the contrary he claims that the thinsnesses of two globes are metaphysically primitive - in other words the most fundamental difference between Euclidean two-globe universe and its tightly curved one-globe counterpart is simply that in one case there are *two* globes and in another case there is *one* – they are not the same reality that is alternatively being *described* as 'two' and as 'one', by the two different geometries. Further, that two distinct realities are swelling over the same descriptions is not determinable by epistemic relations. Rather, it is because there *is* a primitive distinctness that we can pronounce *them* as having the same suchness. [13]

*Adams's Special Argument Against the Principle of I.I:* Adams considers another way (apart from the spatial dispersion argument) whereby one can seek to refute the principle of I.I. and establish two non-identical but

indiscernible objects. He conjectures the possibility of there being two *almost* indiscernible objects in the same world, in a certain relation with each other, and this relation is not affected in any way by the slightest change in their qualities. One can further conceive that these almost indiscernible objects in  $W$  - are two twins differing only with respect to a mental property. Though they have the same perceptions, same imagination, they only differ regarding a small detail of their dream – one dreams of Saraswati with four hands, while in another's dream Saraswati figures with three hands. If this is conceivable, Adams urges that a world with perfectly indiscernible twins is also possible. He registers certain interesting points in this connection: (1) The twins are qualitatively different with regard to their dreams, and that proves that non-identity (2) We can re-name  $W$  as  $W_1$  - with respect to which there can be another world  $W_2$  - where both these twins of  $W_1$  come to have exact counterparts. That is, in  $W_2$  the first individual really resembles the second twin of  $W_1$ , i.e. he dreams Saraswati with three hands, while the second twin of  $W_2$  resembles the first twin of  $W_1$  and dreams her as with four hands. *That is, from the almost indiscernibility of twins in one world we can conjure full indiscernibility by glossing over that slight difference in dreams, contriving crosswise the exact counterpart of each twin in a different world.*

It further follow that if two objects are non-identical in one world – with respect to a slight difference - what one can at most imagine is to have qualitatively identical objects in different worlds –

either (a) by recasting their dreams as qualitatively identical (levelling out that difference in the number of hands of Saraswati) in  $W_1$ ,

or (b) by switching their dreams with respect to another pair of qualitatively identical twins in  $W_2$ . In other words we can imagine the almost- indiscernibility to turn into a perfect indiscernibility in another world, but one cannot turn the non-identity in one world to an identity in another world.

Lastly mutual distinctness is independent of qualitative difference for the latter may arise at a subsequent point of time. If the two twins were indiscernible till the age of 22, their mutual distinctness - say at seventeen, will not depend on the subsequent difference in dream that may emerge five years later.

### 3. Adams on *de re* Modality, *de re* Identity, Primitive Identity *vis a vis* Non-Qualitative Identity

Adams distinguishes between the following propositions –

- 1) *De re* modality or ontologically necessary distinction between two individuals or their respective identities can be maintained without imagining world-variations and without imagining qualities remaining the same or being different across different worlds.
- 2) Issues of *de re* identity or distinctness can make significant additions to modal facts only depending on

whether the trans-world-identities or non-identities can be shown to be primitive or derivative, i.e. whether they are shown to be unanalyzable, or whether they have to be cashed out in terms of some more fundamental relations across possible worlds.

- 3) Trans-world identity and non-identity can be smoothly demonstrated to be primitive or fundamental if one accepts non-qualitative thisness.
- 4) *The issue of trans-world identity however is the issue whether the identity is primitive, and not whether it is non-qualitative.*

Adams explains what is precisely meant by a kind of identity being primitive. Speaking more generally we can say *the qualitative identity between two individuals is primitive, if it explains why the purportedly different individuals coincide in same space and time; contrariwise their spatio-temporal identity will be regarded as primitive if that explains why they have the same qualities.* Adams takes up the issue as to when two properties belonging to the same object can be said to display a primitive identity, as contrasted with a derivative identity. [6, 9] The fact that two properties say *being the Noble Laureate Bengali poet* and *being husband of Mrinalini Devi* are identified in Rabindranath Tagore throws open the question as to whether this identity is primitive, i.e. whether it consist in a fundamental and non-violable relation between Tagore's actual achievement on the one hand and his activities of getting married to Mrinalini Devi. If one can show that one of these two properties can obtain without the second, then their identity in Tagore is exhibited to be derivative. Thus Adams points out that this issue - whether a property is primitive or derivative - is different from the qualitative or non-qualitative character of Tagore's identity in the same or in different worlds.

Adams further points out that the non-qualitative thisness cannot be explained in terms of the quantitative identity of time, i.e. not in terms of persisting through the same stretch of temporal states. A similar proposal would be to make the spatial identity, i.e. the criterion of occupying the same space, the fundamental basis of thisness. [10] The proposal seems attractive though, because two individuals  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  though qualitatively indiscernible, would enjoy a non-qualitative distinctness with respect to the temporal stages they go through.  $S_1$  goes through the successive stage of  $t_1$  to  $t_n$  but while  $S_2$  also goes through qualitatively identical stages – the distinctness of the temporal states of  $S_1$  from the correspondent stages of  $S_2$  will be non-qualitative. This non-qualitative character of  $S_1$ 's temporality would be passed on to the property of being  $S_1$  (at any time). So would not this trans-temporal character of  $S_1$ 's identity (i.e., of persisting through a particular stretch of time) be its fundamental non-qualitative thisness? Adams answers in the negative – for he points out that *it may well be the case that the identity of  $S_1$  at time  $t_1$  with  $S_1$  at time  $t_2$  is to be explained in terms of other more basic relations among the successive states of  $S_1$  - like spatio-temporal continuity, memory links or some causal relations.* These relations or features may be more

fundamental than trans-temporal identity and not presupposing the latter by any means. Thus non-qualitative thisness cannot be explained in terms of trans-temporal identity.

Adams on Leibnitz's notion of *Primitive thisness*: Adams holds that Leibnitz was consistently committed to the purely qualitative character of all thisnesses as well as to the primitiveness of individual identity. As we have already noted, for Leibnitz, thisness amounts to suchness, for him suchness tapers down to being instantiated non-repeatably in an individual – and this instantiation does not fall back on any non-qualitative identity of the individual. (Perhaps one can say that in this respect that Leibnitz's suchness is like Frege's sense, which transparently takes one to the unique referent – independent of the indeterminate, multiply interpretive character of the latter. [4] Further Adams points out that as Leibnitz is a conceptual atomist, he regards thisnesses as conjunctions of simpler, logically independent suchnesses. It is a primitive fact that the suchnesses viz. F and G are instantiated in an individual – not depending on any non-qualitative identity of that individual, and hence the identity of the possessor of F and the possessor of G is also equally fundamental or primitive, not falling back on a still more fundamental character or relation. *Thus for Leibnitz thisnesses are constructed out of simple suchnesses.* [5]

For Leibnitz this primitive identity cannot be a transworld identity because then it has to be the same individual having F in one world and G in another. But Leibnitz says that the identity between the purportedly two individuals having F and G is primitive obtaining in one world. And that it is the same individual, or is the same identity, does not fall back on a more primitive identity – across space and time – or through various permutation and combination of simpler elements in logical space. For Leibnitz to understand identity we do not need to stretch it out, experimentally as it were, through a vast stretch of space and time, to check it out whether it maintains its continuity, or to imagine all conceivable diversities it could adopt through possible worlds. That it is the same individual who is in the same momentary state of hearing a binds' song and tasting a fruit – is irreducibly qualitative and primitive.

## 4. Conclusion

Thus overall Adams agrees with Kripke that transworld identity should be constituted by the individual's freedom from spatial positions, interactions and temporal history, and also insists that Leibnitz should have constructed his theory of possible worlds on this freedom. It is this freedom from relational suchnesses that would turn out to be the non-qualitative transworld identity. But Adams at the same time points out that to admit that there are transworld identities and differences – there has to be necessary ground that would explain why a given thisness also incorporates certain suchness, say for instance why I fall under the category of a human person and not under those of dream, musical performance or football games. For Adams a non-qualitative

thisness does not hold itself aloof from all qualities and their possible variations, but the necessary connexion between a nonqualitative thisness and the possession of its certain properties cannot obviously be laid out in the form of an analytic proposition. Kripke's Introduction 25 reservation against a qualitative thisness consists in the fact that all objects may be falsely represented by inappropriate qualities – which renders all qualities as contingent and dispensable. But the need for this non-conceptual ground of possible variation of qualities was not explicitly appreciated in Kripke's scheme in Naming and Necessity.

Unlike Scotus neither Kripke nor Adams would admit Primitive thisness to be a separate component of the individual object. For Adams Primitive thisness does not hold itself aloof from all possibilities of instantiation, rather it explains in a non-conceptual manner why the thisness instantiates in certain suchnesses and not others. For Scotus on the other hand haecceity of an individual object is not designed to explain any of its suchnesses. For Adams the concentrated identity of an individual substance is tempered by the possibility of a range of instantiation, and this motivates Adams to characterize his theory of Primitive thisness as 'moderate haecceitism'. [11]

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